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Abstract 
 
Objective: To determine whether the returns of initial public offerings (IPOs) of HMOs in the days 
following issue are similar to the return behavior of IPOs in previous studies. 
Data Source: The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes compiled by the Graduate 
School of Business at the University of Chicago provides daily stock prices, holding period re-
turns, and other data pertinent to research in traded securities. 
Study Design: The hypothesis to be tested is whether the mean excess return surrounding the offer 
date is equal to zero.  To adjust the initial returns of the IPOs for overall market movements, 
Standard & Poor’s Composite Index (S&P 500) was selected as the proxy for the market in gener-
al.  We compute the long-run performance for the HMOs and compare that return to the S&P 500 
and the CRSP AMEX/NYSE equally-weighted and value-weighted indices. 
Data Collection/Extraction Method:  We matched for-profit HMOs listed in the National Directo-
ry of Managed & Integrated Care Organizations to the commitment offerings reported by Securi-
ties Data Corporation to the same firms on the daily CRSP tapes.  This left 49 firms that went pub-
lic between 1971 through 1997.  The Wharton Research and Data Services External (WRDSX) 
was used for data extraction and SAS was used for statistical analysis. 
Principal Findings: IPOs of HMOs are underpriced and demonstrate abnormal returns.  The av-
erage initial return on these IPOs is less than that of the average in the United States.  On a long-
run performance basis, they performed better than the broad market indices. 
Conclusions:  Returns follow a similar pattern as do IPOs in general except for the long-run per-
formance.  This needs further research as well as a comparison of performance before and after 
going public in cases where accounting data is available. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
anaged care firms such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have received a lot of atten-
tion in the last ten years.  However, very little empirical financial research has been done in this 
area in the United States.  Many of these firms began as not-for-profit organizations and later con-
verted to for-profit, publicly traded firms.  Initial public offerings (IPOs) have traditionally shown abnormal returns 
soon after the offer date based on studies by Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
and many others.  These studies examined companies that were private and later went public.  This research repli-
cates the methodology of previous work to some extent using the initial public offerings of HMOs to determine 
whether their initial returns surrounding the date they go public are in keeping with those of IPOs in general and ex-
amine their long-run performance. 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email 
 
M 
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This research examines forty-nine for-profit, publicly traded health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to 
determine the return received upon going public.  It seeks to determine whether there were excess returns and wheth-
er those returns were above average as determined by prior research involving initial public offerings (IPOs).  It also 
examines the initial returns to determine whether they are above the historical U.S. average of 15.7%, as reported by 
Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994, updated for 1999). 
 
1.1 Motivation and Contribution  
 
 The motivation for this research is the number of for-profit HMO conversions since the early 1980s.  Clax-
ton, Feder, Schactman, and Altman (1997) report a 53% increase in the number of for-profit HMOs between 1981 
and 1995.  One of the concerns with these conversions was the enormous gain to insiders.  Bell, Snyder, and Tien 
(1997) explain that these gains came, in some cases, to top management and members of the board of directors who 
agreed to the conversion then became stockholders and employees of the new for-profit company.  In other cases, top 
executives received large severance packages that included stock of the company. 
 
 During the early conversion to for-profit status, there were problems with undervaluation of assets.  Bell et. 
al. (1997) give an example of a non-profit HMO whose directors, doctors, and managers purchased the company for 
$4 million and issued themselves stock valued at 33 cents a share.  After conversion to a for-profit HMO, they sold a 
quarter of the company’s stock for $10 million.  During the period of the majority of these conversions, there were 
concerns from analysts and the public as to the distribution of assets of converting nonprofits.  These assets came 
about as the result of charitable contributions, tax exemption, and volunteer time. 
 
 This research seeks to determine the size of the returns to a sample of these HMOs and whether the returns 
are in keeping with that of the average initial public offering in the United States.  Similar empirical research has 
been conducted to determine the size of returns to various types of corporate securities.  Previous research involving 
HMOs has examined the quality of service and other factors relating to these conversions.  Financial research involv-
ing HMOs is lacking.  This research contributes to the existing literature relating to IPOs in general and HMOs spe-
cifically by presenting evidence on returns received by initial public offerings of HMOs following conversion 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
 
 Research has shown that IPOs are underpriced resulting in excess returns to investors able to purchase at the 
offer price or shortly after the initial offer.  Prior research on IPOs by Chalk and Peavy (1987), Miller and Reilly 
(1987), Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988), Ritter (1991), and Rudd (1991) show 
empirically that investors realize large returns if they are able to acquire stock at the offer price on the first day of 
trading.  Ibbotson et. al. (1994, updated for 1999) show an average return of 15.7 percent in a study using data from 
1960 through 1997.  These unusually large returns represent a loss to the company selling the stock.  In the case of 
HMOs, it represents a loss to the public as well. 
 
 Many theories have developed to explain the underpricing of IPOs under equilibrium conditions.  Some of 
these include insurance for the invest banker as explained by Beatty and Ritter (1986), Tinic (1988), and Hughes and 
Thakor (1992).   Existence of a principle-agent problem as explained by Baron (1982).  Signaling as explained by 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Rock (1986), and Welch (1989) suggests that the large 
initial returns are a way of attracting uninformed investor.  Or, they may be an indication of investment fads as sug-
gested by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), Camerer (1989), DeBondt and Thaler (1985), and Shiller (1981).  Monopso-
ny power of investment banks is given as a possible explanation by Ritter (1984), and incomplete market by Mauer 
and Senbet (1992). 
 
 Another issue is that related to the pricing of IPOs is their return performance in the period immediately 
following the offering day called the aftermarket.  IPOs generally make good investments if purchased at the offer 
price and held for one day.  Empirical research has shown that their long-run performance is negative in many cases.  
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), and Ritter (1991) find that investors in IPOs earn 
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negative returns after the first day of trading.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) find empirical evidence that IPOs under-
perform as compared to a group of matching firms on a long-term basis of three to five years.  
 
 Our research is similar to prior studies of IPO returns of different types of securities.  Loderer, Sheehan, and 
Kadlec (1991) study preferred stock and found they are not underpriced.  In addition, Muscarella (1988), Michaely, 
and Shaw (1994) found that the mean initial-day returns of IPOs of master limited partnerships are not underpriced.  
Peavy (1990) found no significant underpricing for closed-end fund IPOs.  Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) found 
overpricing in the case of real estate investment trust IPOs.  Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1997) found that IPOs 
of speculative grade debt are underpriced like equity IPOs, while those rated investment grade are overpriced.  Final-
ly, Brav and Gompers (1997) found that the long-run performance of venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-
backed IPOs using equally weighted returns.  This research replicates portions of the Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
paper for long-run performance, and compares underpricing of IPOs to the average found by Ibbotson, Sindelar, and 
Ritter (1994, updated). 
 
 Loughran and Ritter (1995) examine the returns of 4,753 firms going public in the United States from 1970 
through 1990 immediately following the IPO and at one-, three-, and five-year intervals following the IPO offer date.  
These are compared to 3,702 firms with seasoned (not IPOs) equity offerings to determine the average returns of 
each and whether the returns to these IPOs are significantly different.  They found that both types of new issues had 
poor long-run performance. 
 
3.0 Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
 The preliminary sample was obtained by matching for-profit HMOs listed in the National Directory of Ma-
naged & Integrated Care Organizations with the firms listed in the commitment offerings reported by Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC).  To be in the sample, a firm must be incorporated in the U.S. on the offer date, and must be 
listed on the daily Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. Although there are many for-profit HMOs, 
companies where the stock is privately held and are not publicly traded 
were not included in the data set.  We found 85 publicly traded HMOs.  
However only 49 HMOs that went public between 1971 through 1997 had 
an offer price that was available in the SDC database.  Table 1 shows the 
breakdown of the 49 companies by year. 
 
 Daily stock prices from the end of the offer day to the end of the 
eighth day were obtained from the CRSP tapes.  To adjust the initial re-
turns of the IPOs for overall market movements, the Standard & Poor’s 
Composite Index (S&P 500) was selected as the proxy for the market in 
general.  The Wharton Research and Data Services External (WRDSX) 
was used for data extraction and the Statistical Analysis System

 (SAS) 
was used to analyze the data. 
 
3.2 Statistical Tests 
 
 The hypothesis to be tested is whether the mean excess return sur-
rounding the offer date is equal to zero.  To adjust the initial returns of the 
IPOs for overall market movements, Standard & Poor’s Composite Index 
(S&P 500) was selected as the proxy for the market in general.  This data 
for each of the eight days was available on the CRSP tapes. We also com-
pute the long-run performance for the HMOs and compare that return to 
benchmarks such as the S&P 500 index, the CRSP AMEX/NYSE equally-
weighted return, and Loughran and Ritter (1995) did the CRSP 
AMEX/NYSE value-weighted return as. 
Table 1: Composition of the Sample of 
IPOs 
  Number 
Year of IPOs 
1971 1 
1978 1 
1981 1 
1983 4 
1984 4 
1985 1 
1986 5 
1989 2 
1991 8 
1992 5 
1993 4 
1994 3 
1995 3 
1996 3 
1997 4 
Total 49 
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 Each stock’s excess return was computed as follows: 
 
Equation #1: Excess Return from Offer Price 
 
]I/Iln[]P/Pln[e 0t0iitit   
 
Pit is the after-market price of stock i at time t, Pi0 is the offering price of stock i, It is the value of the S&P 500 index 
at time t, and I0 is the index’s value on the date that the stock is offered to the public.  This was calculated for days t 
equals from 1 to 8.  The equation is simply the log ratio of the aftermarket price to the offer price divided by the log 
ratio of the S&P 500 index from the time of offer over the aftermarket period.  
 
Equation #2: Excess Return Less Day 1 Return 
 
]I/Iln[]P/Pln[e 1t1iitit   
 
This is the same equation as Equation #1, however, each day is compared to Day 1 instead of the offer price 
to determine the effects of investors purchasing the stock two days following the offer.  This was calculated for days 
2 through 8. 
 
Equation #3: T-test statistic to test H0: Average Initial Return (ir)=U.S. Historical Average of 15.7% 
 
uritiessec.of.number
)ir(iancevar
%7.15)ir(average
t

  
 
Ibbotson et.al. (1994, updated for 1999) found that the average initial return on IPOs in the U.S. between 1960 and 
1997 was 15.7 percent.  Equation #3 is used to test whether the average initial return for the 49 companies studied is 
close to the average. 
 
Equation #4: Buy and Hold Return 
 






 

]delist,Tmin[
startt
itiT 1)r1(R   100% 
 
Equation 4 gives the return of each security as an indication of long-run performance.  Alternatively, it can 
be called the percentage buy-and-hold return for firm i at date T.  Start is the date of the first CRSP-listed closing 
price after the initial offering, min [T,delist] is the earlier of the last day the stock is listed in the CRSP data as hav-
ing traded (delisting) or the end of the one-, three-, or five-year period used to measure long-run performance (T), 
and rit is the return for stock i on date t.  The buy-and-hold return is obtained by multiplying each day’s return times 
the next until the last day is reached.  Finally the result is converted to a percentage 
 
3.2 Results 
 
3.2.1 Performance in the Aftermarket 
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 Table 1 shows that the mean excess re-
turn following the offer jumps dramatically from 
the offer price to Day 1, then de-clines each day 
following.  On the other hand, the index rises un-
iformly in the aftermarket, reflecting the current 
rising market.  The underpricing is evidenced by 
the large jump in the return from the offer to the 
end of Day one. 
 
 Table 2, Panel A indicates that the mean 
excess return for each day is significantly different 
from the market index at the 0.0001 significance 
level for four days following the offer, then it be-
gins to decline from day five through day eight.  
Panel B of Table 2 examines excess return over 
the same period, days 1 through 8, assuming an 
investment at the end of the first day of trading.  
When the offer day is excluded, IPO returns in 
days 2 and 3 are not significantly 
greater than the market index.  How-
ever it is negative and increasingly 
so following the day of offer.  This is 
consistent with the findings of Ag-
garwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ibbot-
son, Sindelar, and Ritter (1991). 
 
 Figure 1 graphically de-
monstrates the jump in the price just 
following the offer, and then demon-
strates a gradual decline following 
day 1.  This again demonstrates the 
underperformance substantiated by 
previous studies.  We also found the 
average initial return for the compa-
nies studied to be 11.38 percent with 
a t statistic of –2.085 which is statis-
tically different and lower than the 
U.S. average at a p-value of 0.02. 
 
3.2.2 Long-Run Performance 
 
 Table 3 shows the holding 
period returns for the IPOs over a 
one-year, three-year, and five-year 
period as was done in the Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) paper with IPOs in 
general.  The number of firms (N) 
included over these periods vary as a 
result of differing offer dates and 
whether any firm experienced delist-
ing during the period.  The one-year 
re-turns as much smaller than the 
Table 1.1: Mean and Standard Error  
of Price and Index by Day 
  Price Index 
Day Mean Std Error Mean Std Error 
Offer 12.75 0.71 388.48 28.90 
1 14.34 0.90 388.15 28.99 
2 14.30 0.91 388.95 29.21 
3 14.24 0.92 389.06 28.21 
4 14.10 0.92 389.43 29.33 
5 14.05 0.93 389.25 29.14 
6 14.00 0.93 389.07 29.08 
7 13.98 0.92 389.12 29.09 
8 13.88 0.93 389.50 29.22 
 
Table 2: Market-adjusted Performance  
of 49 IPOs for Up to Eight Daysfor the Period 1971 to 1997 
Panel A.  Mean Excess Return From Offer Price 
 Mean Std Error T statistic P-value 
Days from Offer     
1 Day 0.1017 0.0174 5.8311 0.0001 
2 Days 0.0960 0.0172 5.5741 0.0001 
3 Days 0.0904 0.0172 5.2596 0.0001 
4 Days 0.0790 0.0178 4.4472 0.0001 
5 Days 0.0738 0.0187 3.9361 0.0003 
6 Days 0.0694 0.0196 3.5372 0.0009 
7 Days 0.0676 0.0204 3.3129 0.0018 
8 Days 0.0579 0.0230 2.5131 0.0154 
Panel B.  Mean Excess Return Less Day 1 Return 
 Mean Std Error T statistic P-value 
Days from Offer     
2 Days -0.0058 0.0048 -1.1975 0.2370 
3 Days -0.0113 0.0070 -1.6245 0.1108 
4 Days -0.0227 0.0092 -2.4837 0.0165 
5 Days -0.0279 0.0102 -2.7468 0.0084 
6 Days -0.0323 0.0111 -2.9213 0.0053 
7 Days -0.0341 0.0120 -2.8380 0.0066 
8 Days -0.0439 0.0147 -2.9850 0.0045 
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three- or five- year return.  There is a large 
variance in the five-year returns.  
 
  Table 3.1 shows the returns as com-
pared to three broad market benchmark in-
dices; the CRSP-American Stock Ex-
change/New York Stock Exchange (AMEX/ 
NYSE) equally weighted index, the CRSP-
AMEX/NYSE value-weighted index, and the 
Standard and Poors 500 (S&P 500) index.  
The first column shows the IPO return for 
each period, and the second column gives the 
return to the benchmark index.  The third col-
umn shows the p-value, wherein the test was 
whether the return to the IPOs was significantly different from the return to the respective benchmark index.  The 
fourth column shows what Loughran and Ritter (1995) refer to as the “wealth relative”.  This is another way to de-
Figure 1.  Mean Excess Return from Offer Price and Mean 
Excess Return Less Day 1 Return
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Table 3.  Holding Period Return Summary Statistics 
Long-Run Performance     N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
One-year IPO return   45 30.13% 9.95% -61.29% 247.54% 
Three-year IPO return   33 95.41% 26.77% -88.54% 563.40% 
Five-year IPO return     19 214.43% 107.84% -97.92% 1905.77% 
Table 3.1.  Average One-Year, Three-Year, And Five-Year Returns And 
Wealth Relatives Computed Using Alternative Benchmarks 
          One-Year Returns   
     IPO Benchmark T-test Wealth 
Benchmark       Return Return P-value Relative 
          
CRSP Amex-NYSE EW Index    30.13% 14.65% 0.1301 1.1476 
CRSP Amex-NYSE VW Index    30.13% 30.31% 0.9854 1.0235 
Standard & Poors' 500       30.13% 12.31% 0.0844 1.1733 
          Three-Year Returns   
     IPO Benchmark T-test Wealth 
Benchmark       Return Return P-value Relative 
          
CRSP Amex-NYSE EW Index    95.41% 53.31% 0.1474 1.3441 
CRSP Amex-NYSE VW Index    95.41% 137.88% 0.0895 0.8230 
Standard & Poors' 500       95.41% 44.87% 0.0873 1.4514 
          Five-Year Returns   
     IPO Benchmark T-test Wealth 
Benchmark       Return Return P-value Relative 
          
CRSP Amex-NYSE EW Index    214.43% 110.20% 0.3569 1.6075 
CRSP Amex-NYSE VW Index    214.43% 299.95% 0.4044 0.7915 
Standard & Poors' 500       214.43% 92.67% 0.2877 1.8172 
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termine whether the benchmark index return is larger than the IPO return during the period.  The holding period re-
turn for the IPO is divided by the holding period return for the benchmark index.  This figure is averaged across all 
firms for each trading day during a year.  A value greater than 1 indicates the market outperformed the IPOs based 
on that benchmark.  However, the p-value indicates whether there is a significant difference. 
 
Table 4 shows the holding period returns for all 85 HMOs in the original data set over a one-year, three-
year, and five-year period.  We decided to include those HMOs that did not have an offer price listed in the SDC 
database since the IPO return data was available in CRSP.  This gives a general feel for the long-run performance of 
all HMOs over the same periods.  As indicated in Table 4.1 during all three periods the HMOs outperformed the 
Table 4: Holding Period Return Summary Statistics 
Long-Run Performance  N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
        
One-year IPO return  85 23.80% 8.15% -85.98% 286.75% 
Three-year IPO return  63 68.01% 17.69% -96.84% 563.40% 
Five-year IPO return  44 177.48% 63.82% -97.92% 1905.77% 
Table 4.1:  Average One-Year, Three-Year, And Five-Year Returns And 
Wealth Relatives Computed Using Alternative Benchmarks 
     One-Year Returns  
        
    IPO Benchmark T-test Wealth 
Benchmark    Return Return P-value Relative 
        
CRSP Amex-NYSE EW 
Index   23.80% 9.48% 0.0697 1.1241 
CRSP Amex-NYSE VW 
Index   23.80% 21.81% 0.7924 1.0254 
Standard & Poors' 500   23.80% 7.38% 0.0398 1.1485 
     Three-Year Returns  
        
    IPO Benchmark T-test Wealth 
Benchmark    Return Return P-value Relative 
        
CRSP Amex-NYSE EW 
Index   68.01% 46.78% 0.2419 1.1614 
CRSP Amex-NYSE VW 
Index   68.01% 123.25% 0.0005 0.7249 
Standard & Poors' 500   68.01% 37.34% 0.0975 1.2649 
     Five-Year Returns  
        
    IPO Benchmark T-test Wealth 
Benchmark    Return Return P-value Relative 
        
CRSP Amex-NYSE EW 
Index   177.48% 94.53% 0.2027 1.4599 
CRSP Amex-NYSE VW 
Index   177.48% 274.25% 0.1160 0.7277 
Standard & Poors' 500   177.48% 73.67% 0.1153 1.6863 
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broad market in all but the CRSP-AMEX/NYSE value-weighted index return during years three and four.  However, 
the returns were not statistically significant.  Panel B shows that in year three the CRSP-AMEX/NYSE value-
weighted index returns out performed the HMOs at a significance level of 8% which is in keeping with the results in 
Table 3 for the 49 HMOs 
 
3.2.3 Comparing Firms Before and After the Stock Market Crash of 1987 
 
The latter part of the eighties and the nineties saw a wave of mergers of managed care organizations 
(MCO's) such as HMO's.  By merging with other MCO's, these firms would increase coverage with the motive of 
getting larger discounts and increasing market power.  Using the stock market crash of 1987 as a cutoff point and 
observing the move toward mergers, the long-run performance before and after this point is evaluated.  There was 
less merger activity before 1987 and more merger activity after 1987.  Among the 49 securities, 17 were pre-1987 
and 32 were post-1987.  The initial return for the pre-1987 firms was 0.0999 with a p-value of 0.0195.  The  
TABLE 5.  Market-adjusted Performance of 17 IPOs for Up to Eight Days for the Period 1971 to 1986 
Panel A.  Mean Excess Return From Offer Price 
 Mean Std Error T statistic P-value 
Days from Offer     
1 Day 0.0877 0.0328 2.6767 0.0165 
2 Days 0.0789 0.0328 2.4019 0.0288 
3 Days 0.0770 0.0335 2.2953 0.0356 
4 Days 0.0639 0.0355 1.7992 0.0909 
5 Days 0.0516 0.0326 1.5836 0.1329 
6 Days 0.0549 0.0326 1.6868 0.1110 
7 Days 0.0549 0.0357 1.5353 0.1442 
8 Days 0.0528 0.0377 1.4017 0.1801 
Panel B.  Mean Excess Return Less Day 1 Return 
 Mean Std Error T statistic P-value 
Days from Offer     
2 Days -0.0088 0.0094 -0.9366 0.3629 
3 Days -0.0107 0.0161 -0.6680 0.5137 
4 Days -0.0238 0.0218 -1.0928 0.2907 
5 Days -0.0361 0.0218 -1.6540 0.1176 
6 Days -0.0328 0.0214 -1.5313 0.1452 
7 Days -0.0329 0.0234 -1.4046 0.1793 
8 Days -0.0349 0.0243 -1.4349 0.1706 
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Initial return post-1987 was 0.1212 with a p-value less than 0.0001.  Comparing the initial returns for both periods 
showed no significant difference in returns.  Table 5 shows that the excess return from offer price was significant 
only for Days 1, 2, and 3 pre-1987 while it was significant for all eight days after the offer post-1987 with no signifi-
cant day differences pre- and post-1987.  Conversely, Table 6 shows that the excess return from the Day One return 
was not significant at all pre-1987 while it was significant only for Days 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 post-1987, again with no 
significant day difference pre- and post-1987. 
 
 These results are interesting and demonstrate the change in the market before and after 1987. Pre-1987, the 
returns normalize quickly in the eight days following the offering whereas the post-1987 returns do not normalize 
and stay relatively high in the eight days following the offering.  However, in looking only at the returns less Day 1 
for the same periods, the for both pre- 1987 returns do not normalize but stay relatively high throughout the seven 
day period.  The post-1987 returns normalize much more quickly during those seven days.  This could demonstrate 
the markets awareness of the true value of these firms during the early years of conversions.  Returns of later conver-
sions would not be as dramatic. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Market-Adjusted Performance Of 32 Ipos For Up To Eight Days For The Period 1988 To 1997 
Panel A.  Mean Excess Return From Offer Price 
 Mean Std Error T statistic P-value 
Days from Offer     
1 Day 0.1092 0.0205 5.3145 <.0001 
2 Days 0.1050 0.0200 5.2566 <.0001 
3 Days 0.0975 0.0197 4.9565 <.0001 
4 Days 0.0870 0.0199 4.3716 0.0001 
5 Days 0.0856 0.0230 3.7201 0.0008 
6 Days 0.0771 0.0248 3.1048 0.0040 
7 Days 0.0744 0.0252 2.9562 0.0059 
8 Days 0.0606 0.0295 2.0562 0.0483 
Panel B.  Mean Excess Return Less Day 1 Return 
 Mean Std Error T statistic P-value 
Days from Offer     
2 Days -0.0042 0.0055 -0.7515 0.4580 
3 Days -0.0117 0.0067 -1.7409 0.0916 
4 Days -0.0222 0.0083 -2.6796 0.0117 
5 Days -0.0236 0.0106 -2.2216 0.0337 
6 Days -0.0321 0.0128 -2.5011 0.0179 
7 Days -0.0348 0.0139 -2.5068 0.0176 
8 Days -0.0486 0.0186 -2.6081 0.0139 
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4.0 Conclusion 
 
 Previous research examines the returns from initial public offerings of common equity relative to the market 
index, and finds excess returns to investors who can buy at the offer price.  Empirical research also shows that the 
long-run performance of IPOs under performs the market returns.  This research has shown that returns to IPOs of 
HMOs around the offer day follow a similar pattern.  There is an excess return immediately following the offer price 
that drops quickly in the aftermarket.  The excess return appears smaller than historical returns of IPOs.   
 
 Long-run performance of HMO-IPOs did not follow the usual behavior of IPO long-run performance as 
compared to the broad market indices.  The HMOs outperformed the market in the first, third, and fifth year for all 
but the CRSP AMEX/NYSE value-weighted index in years three and five.  This may be an indication of the expan-
sion by way of mergers that managed care organizations in general experienced during the 80’s and 90’s.  In examin-
ing the pre-and post- 1987 returns, it appears that the market reaction to these conversions was not as dramatic in the 
post-1987 period as in the pre-1987 period.  Areas for future research include investigation of the impact of this ex-
pansion.  In addition, further research will examine the performance before going public as compared to the perfor-
mance after going public in cases where accounting data is available.  
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